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Transpersonal psychology has at times critiqued the broader psychology field
for perpetrating a somewhat arbitrary Cartesian subject-object divide. Some
phenomenologists claim that reframing this purported divide as an experienced
phenomenon can defuse its philosophical impact. If subjective experiences are
viewed as continuous with the lifeworld out of which objective phenomena are
abstracted, the divide between these is revealed as a somewhat arbitrary, if useful,
construction. This, in turn, challenges psychology to engage with subjective
phenomena in a more substantive way. In this paper based on excerpts from a
protracted email conversation held on the American Psychological Association’s
Humanistic Psychology (Division 32) listserv, two academic psychologists with
transpersonal interests explore this extraordinary claim of phenomenology, one
being a proponent and the other being a skeptic of the claim. Two other academic
psychologists with transpersonal interests who participated in this dialogue
comment on its relevance for transpersonal psychology. The conversation focuses
on the ideas of Husserl and Heidegger, and emphasizes how phenomenology
might reconcile the subject-object divide through exploring intentionality, the
meaning of noetic/noema, and thinking itself, while the discussion serves as an
example of an adversarial collaboration in which disagreeing parties seek deeper
understanding through dialogue.
Keywords: adversarial collaboration, phenomenology, transpersonal,
philosophy of science, Heidegger, Husserl, subject/object dualism,
Cartesian dualism, noetic/noema, Dasein, thinking

T

he listserv for the Society of Humanistic
Psychology (also known as the American
Psychological
Association
Humanistic
Psychology Division 32) had a history of producing
protracted, often intense, dialogues at the
intersection of complex issues within psychology
and related fields, such as philosophy. One of
these previous conversations (Franco, Friedman,
& Arons, 2008) was reformatted for academic
publication because of the depth of its examination
of the qualitative-quantitative methodological

divide within humanistic research. This allowed for
differing views to be aired back-and-forth as a type
of adversarial collaboration, providing opportunities
for generating common ground among the
participants and observers of these conversations.
Another one of these “epic” collaborations on
the same listserv occurred between Brent Dean
Robbins (B. D. R.) and Harris L. Friedman (H. L. F.),
with Chad V. Johnson (C. V. J.) and Zeno Franco
(Z. F.) participating (along with lesser involvement
by some others) during the years 2009 and 2010).
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It focused on the claim that phenomenology can
reconcile the dualism involving the Cartesian subjectobject divide, which could be of great interest to
many transpersonal scholars not familiar with the
complex approach of phenomenology in this area.
Over these two years, we explored the claim made
by Husserl and Heidegger that phenomenology is
foundational to all scientific endeavors, and that it
can transcend the troubling subject-object dualism
found in post-positivistic science. This position
that it does this successfully is championed by B.
D. R., but is challenged by H. L. F. in a series of
deep interchanges. Although heavily edited with
many deletions for brevity, many of B. D. R. and H.
L. F.’s interchanges are captured verbatim, providing
a vivid glimpse of a sincere yet agonistic dialogue
(Tannen, 2002) in which two seasoned academic
psychologists with transpersonal interests debated
and argued their way to a deeper understanding. C.
V. J. and Z. F., primarily in observer roles throughout
this exchange, offer their initial and concluding
thoughts to frame this discussion, and served as the
primary arbiters of what portions of the interchanges
would be removed or retained.
We start with introductory statements from
Z. F. and C. V. J. Then we plunge into the dialogue
with B. D. R. taking the opening move.
Setting the Context for the Dialogue
f interest to me (Z. F.) was the unfolding
sense of understanding of B. D. R.’s position
throughout the intense questioning by H. L.
F., who often pushed to have the difficult-tocomprehend portions of Heidegger’s and Husserl’s
work expressed in common language—in effect
holding B. D. R.’s “feet to the fire” to describe
these concepts in terms everyone on the list would
find approachable. H. L. F. also provided a deeply
skeptical view of subjectivity, while B. D. R. held
to "privileging the inner, experience, over the outer,
objective reality." By default, I find myself favoring
H. L. F.’s bias toward the external, the publically
accessible, and the “objective.” However, B. D. R.’s
recitations and exemplars pointing toward the idea
of das Verliegende, or “letting lie forward,” were
compelling and, for a brief moment in re-reading
the manuscript, I no longer saw B. D. R.’s arguments
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as a tautology, but instead suspected that he might
just be right.
In contrast, at the time of this exchange, I
(C. V. J.) was fascinated with and lacked fluency
in phenomenology. The in-depth study of lived
experience and the search for “the things in
themselves” appealed to me, as did claims that
phenomenology successfully addressed the vexing
problem of Cartesian dualism. I was interested in its
place in humanistic, existential, and transpersonal
psychologies, as well as its overall relevance for
science. I had been trained in qualitative research
and supported its role in the human sciences, but
was mostly familiar with other methodologies
like grounded theory. I wondered what kind of
philosophy (and research methodology) it was, how
it was practiced, and what it offered the human
sciences and transpersonal psychology with its
emphasis on consciousness and an interconnected
unity of phenomena. Were its claims defensible?
Was it worth the time and effort to learn its
philosophy and methodology? What did it offer
me as a transpersonal psychologist, a researcher,
a human being? Why was it held in such high
esteem among some in humanistic, existential, and
transpersonal psychology? I found this exchange
a wonderful introduction to phenomenology and
philosophy of science, yet also quite erudite and
worthwhile for those more experienced with these
issues. Concomitantly, I studied phenomenological
literature to learn more and ascertain who was more
correct: B. D. R., with his admirable command of
phenomenology and qualitative research, and ability
to clearly communicate its concepts, which many
find mystifying and enigmatic; or H. L. F., whose
knowledge of the philosophy of science, training in
quantitative research methods, and deeply skeptical
and wily mind pushed ideas and thinkers to their
limits? Each time I read this exchange, I reached
a different conclusion. It is truly up to readers to
decide for themselves.
Is Phenomenology Foundational?
B D R (1)
Just as a preliminary reflection on these
questions, I would say that I do not presume that
science should always be about prediction and
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 145

control. Prediction and control exist in the realm of
explanation but explanation ultimately is grounded
in description, and description is necessarily
qualitative in nature. We need to define what it is we
are studying—what it means—before we can begin
to even imagine how to predict what will happen to
it in the future. This process of categorizing things
has, for example, metaphysical assumptions at its
roots. This means whether we realize it or not,
science is always already a metaphysics. A radical
science attempts to bracket those assumptions and
question radically the meaning of what it is we are
studying. That is why I think phenomenology is
foundational for all of science.
H L F (1)
B. D. R. stated, "phenomenology is
foundational for all of science," but I think this
is only partially true, supported by the notion
that empiricism rests on perceived phenomena,
but perhaps contradicted by the notion that
phenomena present themselves independently of a
perceiver and, hence, the phenomena (or perhaps
the noumena presenting to us as phenomena) are
equally foundational in and of themselves. So this
framing of phenomenology as foundational seems
wedded to a Cartesian divide of inner vs. outer, if I
am understanding it correctly, and one privileging
the inner, subjective experience, over the outer,
"objective" reality. In a similar fashion, paraphrasing
Feynman, "physics and phenomenology are both
foundational to all science" (Sands, 2011).
I was thinking about this after reading
Craig's (2007) incredibly erudite introductory paper
in The Humanistic Psychologist. His discussions of
Dasein point in this direction in a clearer fashion
than I have previously read (or maybe I am now
more able to hear the message). On the other
end of the spectrum, ecological psychology (e.g.,
Gibson & Gibson, 1955) and the more recent
work of Scott Kelso (1995) in dynamic systems
theory support the growing possibility of a more
widespread transcending of this annoying Cartesian
divide by "objective" science. In this sense, I think
to claim phenomenology as foundational to science
is a limited view, privileging one perspective over
another. Am I missing something, B. D. R.?

Understanding Phenomenology and Dasein
B D R (2)
Thanks for your questions and willingness
to engage me on these issues, H. L. F. The key point
you make is that by stating that phenomenology
is foundational for all of science, I am therefore
"wedded to a Cartesian divide of inner vs. outer" and
"privileging the inner, experience, over the outer,
objective reality." If I thought phenomenology was
the study of subjectivity, then, yes, my statement
would amount to as much as you state. However,
phenomenology as I understand it is not merely
the investigation of subjectivity. If phenomenology
was description of subjectivity and nothing more,
then I would not endorse the statement that
phenomenology is the foundation of all science.
If phenomenology is not the description of
subjectivity, then what is it? To put it as succinctly
as possible, I will say that phenomenology is a
"step back" from the epistemological assumptions
that give rise to the categories of "subjectivity" and
"objectivity" and, therefore, amounts to a radical
return to the phenomena as they appear prior to
such metaphysical claims. More radically, the
phenomenologist inquires into the very conditions
of possibility for such questions in the first place.
In Husserlian language, we can say that
categories of subjectivity and objectivity are a
function of the natural attitude—a certain habitual
and ingrained way of distinguishing between "types"
of phenomena based on a manner of thinking
which has not radically questioned its meaning and
ground (Husserl, 1913/2012; see also Luft, 1998).
The phenomenological reduction places those
assumptions in abeyance and begins by a return
"to the things themselves" prior to preconceptions
about what is subjective or objective (Husserl,
1913/2012; see also Schmitt, 1959).
Within transcendental phenomenology,
the process moves from this level of description to
what is called the eidetic reduction or the search
for what is essential, or better put, the conditions
of possibility for being-in-the-world. By articulating
the meaning and ground of being-in-the-world,
phenomenology is articulating the meaning and
ground for any inquiry whatsoever, including the
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c onditions that open the possibility for any science,
whether human or natural in terms of its content.
Ultimately, this Husserlian project is what
led Heidegger (1927/2008) to the insights articulated
in Being and Time, for example, where Dasein is
understood by the existential analytic as having
the structure of care. This care structure is the
grounds for any kind of meaningful investigation
or any human project for that matter. And Dasein
is a non-dualistic concept, a radical description of
world disclosedness, the characteristic of Being prior
to any metaphysical distinction between subject
and object, inner or outer, etc. Dasein is literally
translated as “there-being”—the clearing in which
we reside in-the-world with others and alongside
things. What in Dasein is "inner" or "outer"? Where is
the "subject" of Dasein? These terms are meaningless
within Heidegger's Daseinanalytic. They become
irrelevant and antiquated concepts of a Cartesian
metaphysics that is surpassed by phenomenology.
And ultimately phenomenology reveals that
Cartesian metaphysics—actually a worldview prefigured prior to Descartes in, for example, Galileo's
physics and linear perspective art—is a kind of
nihilism, most famously announced in the form of
a madman by Nietzsche (1883/2016) in Thus Spake
Zarathustra. Phenomenology, in turn, is an answer
to that nihilism—a response to it and, arguably, the
means to overcome it.
H L F (2)
I greatly appreciate your explanation and
I agree that the intent of the notion of Dasein, as
promulgated by Heidegger, was explicitly to overcome
the Cartesian divide, even attempting to go beyond
Husserl's call to "a radical return to the phenomena
as they appear prior to . . . metaphysical claims." But
I wonder how well Heidegger really does this? And,
of course, we are talking about differentiating the
earlier from the later writings of Heidegger, as his
presentation of Dasein is acknowledged by scholars
to have shifted considerably in his later writings—
and I am only really familiar with his early Being
and Time (Heidegger, 1927/2008). And I can't go too
deeply into this, as it has been years since I have
read Heidegger and, even then, I found his writings
abstruse (as most do), despite my diligence in
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

attempting to understand him. With that said, I don't
want to be too tied to Heidegger as an authority
in any discussion of how phenomenology might
or might not offer a cogent way to transcend the
Cartesian divide.
So where is my critique of your using the
term “phenomenology as foundational,” as opposed
to seeing physics as also foundational? It seems to
me that Dasein is unavoidably anthropocentric, at
least as I understand Heidegger's use of it. Perhaps
it endeavors to be more than subjectivistic and
attempts to move into the world to see things as
they are in some pre-linguistic and non-categorically
mediated way, but even this is always limited to a
human seeing, hence is tinged with subjectivity,
even if a broadened species-shared "we" form of
subjectivity—if that were to be possible.
Presumably a foundational physics,
however, could be entertained across species, even
into strangely alien cultures. I am thinking of the use
of icons, such as depicting pi in various ways scribed
onto some of our human transplanetary exploration
vessels now heading into the unknown with hopes
of contacting alien consciousnesses. Here is where
physics, and its accompanying mathematics, might
better transcend anthropocentrism and, in that
sense, be just as foundational as phenomenology
or, perhaps, even more so. So to privilege
phenomenology as foundational seems limited
and, alternatively, it seems better to consider both
foundational. I note I took this on in an analogous
way recently, suggesting in a paper that such dualisms
(focusing on transcendence and immanence)
could best be resolved dialectically by positing
complementary, but seemingly incommensurate,
positions to be held simultaneously, since neither or
both could be seen as foundational or amenable,
at least by me, to a decent synthesis (Friedman &
Pappas, 2006).
I fear that the Dasein project attempted by
Heidegger failed and, worse, I fear that the abstruse
language in which it was clothed has deluded
some into thinking it successful, since pontifical
obfuscation can bamboozle those who read more
with hope for confirmation than with the openminded but skeptical willingness to reject critically
when flaws are revealed. Part of why I hold this fear
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 147

is Heidigger's own life course and, although I hate
to criticize ad hominem, he seemed to abandon his
own project, first to Nazism and later to a return to
Shopenhauer's grand theorizing (at least as I recall
from reading some Heideggerian critics years ago,
since I have no first-reading knowledge of this) and
as a mystic delving into Eastern traditions. Ultimately,
to share my deeper interest, I want to write on the
difference between "knowing" and "knowledge"
and our present discussion is in one of the germane
areas to this topic where I feel quite confused.
B D R (3)
The correspondence view of truth is one
of those implicit presuppositions—one of those
metaphysical assumptions I mentioned earlier—
that comes under scrutiny once we engage in
the phenomenological reduction. Heidegger's
(1927/2008) Being and Time questioned the grounds
for the correspondence theory of truth, and arrived
at (what Heidegger claimed is) a more primordial
understanding of truth as a revealing-concealing
advent of Being (aletheia).
For a nice outline of this problem, see Robert
Cavelier's (2017) notes on "The Problem of Truth."
The upshot basically is that what we understand
to be "natural science," for example, Newtonian
physics, is based on a particular understanding of
truth that does reveal things, but at the same time
it conceals other ways of understanding things in
the more primordial disclosedness that is truth in its
more basic (implicitly) lived meaning.

where I think the both/and makes the most sense,
and seeing phenomenology as more foundational
or primary than physics appears somewhat lacking.
Again, however, this leads to a dilemma that
I cannot reconcile, except by willingness to posit
both sides of the divide simultaneously as a both/
and. As Robbins and Craig (2007) have pointed out,
the concept of Dasein is an attempt to transcend this
divide, but I have never understood how it could
successfully do this (and I've tried, but couldn't
grasp it), and now I suspect it is more aspirational
than fait accompli. And there are some parallel
attempts, as I've mentioned, using physical notions
(e.g., complex systems theory) that go far in a similar
direction from an opposite starting place but, I
also suspect, they do not work very well either in
giving a full accounting. I fear I can only offer more
questions than answers, but maybe I misunderstand
Dasein, since I surely do not claim to understand
it well. This is where I hope you might show how
phenomenology is fundamental to science in a way
that physics is not, as I am more questioning that
claim than making any coherent claim of my own.

H L F (3)
In dealing with these extreme counterexamples, I am merely showing ways a physics could
exist and even develop without a phenomenology—
in that sense it is foundational (i.e., it would not be
reducible to phenomenology and would be its own
foundation). I also think a phenomenology could
exist without a physics (i.e., it would not be reducible
to physics), such as consciousness during locked-in
syndrome (pseudocoma) with a person devoid of
all sensory input, as well as motor output. But can
either be "comprehensive" without the other? This is

B D R (4)
I would say that (most) physics is more
anthropocentric than Heidegger's conception of
Dasein. The reason for this is because physics,
which is a human activity of attempting to explain
the physical world in terms that will permit
prediction and control of it, and essentially to map
it for human purposes, is usually confused with the
physical world in itself (see, e.g., Merchant, 1990).
The map, in effect, is confused with the countryside
(Merleau-Ponty, 1962). In contrast, Heidegger's
existential analytic, and the formulation of Dasein
and the care structure, is actually the explication
of the limits of human understanding—human
finitude—rather than an attempt to reduce reality to
human understanding.
Anthropocentricism in phenomenology
could, however, be applied to Sartre, for example,
who was chastised by Heidegger (1977/1993) in his
"Letter on Humanism" for being too anthropocentric
in his interpretation of his work. One can understand
and appreciate physics (and its limits) via Heidegger
and other forms of phenomenology, but one cannot
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Phenomenology and Physics
as Foundational to Knowing

appreciate the existential analytic via physics. This is
a one-way street.
Second, it is important when reading
Heidegger, and most other phenomenologists,
to avoid any temptation to read phenomenology
as an attempt to identify a pre-linguistic or noncategorical world. Your transpersonal background
might pre-dispose you to identify Heidegger with
Zen Buddhism or certain mystical traditions that are
all about accessing a kind of unmediated connection
to the Divine or Nature that is in principle ineffable.
But that is not what Heidegger is doing, as far as I
understand his project. No question, Heidegger was
influenced by some of these mystical traditions—
and probably most especially Meister Eckart, not to
mention Aquinas, who was not quite a mystic—but,
nevertheless, I think it is important to read Heidegger
as up to something different than the mystics.
He does not deny that language is essential
to the human condition—it is an equiprimordial
constituent of Dasein's existential structure—but, as
any good phenomenologist would do, he radically
interrogates the question of what language is in
the first place. For example, in several of his essays
he identifies a particular way of understanding
language in our current age which is configured
by a technological way of understanding things
and is thus contingent and, by implication, does
not adequately capture what is essential about the
meaning of language (Caputo, 1982, 1986).
In any case, as long as one reduces
phenomenology to that of a description of
subjectivity, one will not understand just how
radical phenomenology is, and how physics is
already guided by a set of implicit assumptions that
only phenomenology can identify. The point is that
physics is often ahead of itself in its understanding of
what the world is all about. Even though it is guided
by implicit meanings, these are not explicit to the
practice of physics but unconscious, in a certain
manner of speaking. Phenomenology does the work
of identifying what physics has to assume in order to
even get started, and by doing this, phenomenology
questions radically the meaning and ground of
the project of physics—not to say that physics is
wrong or incorrect within its own framework of
understanding, but rather to make that framework
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

explicit as a particular framework of meaning that
could have been otherwise—that is, in essence,
contingent. And in that sense phenomenology is
foundational for physics and any science, for that
matter. It is the only method (I know of) that can
retrieve what would otherwise remain the meaning
and ground of science—not to mention any other
human activity.
I anticipate that some would return the favor
and say that physics studies the physical world that is
the condition of possibility for human existence (and
knowing) and, therefore, also for phenomenological
thinking. In a certain manner of speaking, yes, of
course it does, and it would be silly to deny it. But it
is not in this sense that I say phenomenology is the
foundation of physics.
When I say phenomenology is foundational
for all of science, including physics, I mean that
phenomenology is foundational to the human
activity of physics, not the physical world itself.
But there are a wide variety of ways to disclose
the meaning of the physical world, and physics is
only one—which does not diminish the science of
physics in the least bit, but simply puts it in its place.
H L F (4)
I am glad you acknowledge that both share
anthropocentrisms, but you claim physics to be
more so. I still am unclear why one would be more
so than the other.
Most good physicists would not confound
the map with the territory, so this seems a
specious argument against physics. And doesn't
phenomenology try to explain in human terms
also, as well as predict to some degree, just as
does physics? And neither is invested necessarily in
control, such as illustrated by astrophysics, where
there is no intention to control the stars—at least
any time soon.
Interesting, human finitude understood
through Dasein as a formulation of the limit of human
understanding vs. the finitude of physical existence
as the ground of any human understanding—now
why is one primary over the other? And is physics
necessarily concerned with human knowing as
much as generating knowledge? I think of Feynman's
oft quoted remarks, "I think I can safely say that no
International Journal of Transpersonal Studies 149

one understands quantum mechanics” (as cited in
Carroll, 2011, para. 3).
So, if physics is concerned with knowledge,
not knowing per se, doesn't that make it primary to
phenomenology regarding knowledge, but perhaps
phenomenology is prior to physics for knowing.
And, if so, what is foundational to science becomes
equally split between knowing and knowledge,
both equally foundational if both are equally
germane to science. And, if phenomenology is
more primary to knowing and knowing is privileged
over knowledge as germane to science, it seems
that puts phenomenology back into being more
subjectivistic, defeating the attempt of Dasein to
integrate subject/object and throwing it back into
privileging subjectivity.
To quote you, B. D. R.: “One can
understand and appreciate physics (and its limits)
via Heidegger and other forms of phenomenology,
but one cannot appreciate the existential analytic
via physics. This is a one-way street.” This is the
crux of the argument—is one more irreducible to
the other? And I would argue still, that one perhaps
can only fully understand the existential analytic
by knowledge of physical existence, which is the
ground for all existential understanding. So both still
seem equally foundational to me.
B. D. R., you said: “In any case, as long as
one reduces phenomenology to that of a description
of subjectivity.” I am willing to entertain this idea as
the intent of the concept of Dasein, though I doubt it
ever achieves its attempt to fully escape subjectivity,
which is why I see it as more aspiration than actual.
Are you familiar with the Gibsons' (1955, 1979)
work on ecological psychology that "throws" (to use
Heidegger's term) consciousness (i.e., perception)
into the world without any dualisms or homunculi?
And Kelso's (1995) and others' dynamic systems
theory (e.g., see Thelen, 1995), which makes
minimal assumptions and relies on self-organizing,
rather than a-priori imposed assumptions (or at least
minimizes such assumptions)?
I think you underestimate the astuteness
of many physicists, perhaps confusing them with
engineers? And physicists, who vary assumptions to
explore their differential implications, seem overall
freer from such constraints than phenomenologists,
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who acknowledge the limitations of any attempts to
bracket. So, can a physics get started as a human
enterprise and, through that process, proceed in ways
that rapidly veer from human limitations (e.g., through
radically extending human perceptual limitations
and using mathematics and other extrapolations to
discover that which the more purposefully naïve
phenomenological stance could never accomplish)
and perhaps accomplish the ultimate bracketing
(e.g., having an artificial intelligence [AI] process
devoid of human bias, at least once launched from
a human initiative)? Yes, just what I was thinking in
considering both as equally foundation and both
with similar, complementary, limits.
So here is the crux. Does physics only reveal
a socially-constructed map of the territory or is there
some revealing of the territory provided by physics
that is not just anthropocentric and that places
physics not just as one revelation among many (the
postmodern relativistic leveling of all truth claims,
equating the worth of the view of physics with that
of even the biblical view), but something more
substantial, touching toward the real or perhaps,
phenomenologically speaking, the essence? In other
words, is physics discovering something objectively
true about external reality or merely relatively true
limited by human perception and interpretation thus
constructing a distorted, anthropocentric reality? I
think physics is discovering something externally
valid, but what are your thoughts?
B D R (5)
I would want to be careful about taking
too seriously any claims that physics is "sociallyconstructed," because I think this term comes with a
lot of epistemological and ontological baggage that
I would not want to claim for phenomenology. I'd
rather say that physics is indeed disclosing a truth
about the world. But it is not the only way of disclosing
truth about the physical world. By clarifying the way
of revealing truth (in the Greek sense of aletheia) as it
occurs in physics, and contrasting and comparing it
with other types of disclosing, this helps us recognize
the limits of physics without having to throw out
the field as we know it. Now, how would we go
about interrogating the meaning of "truth" in ways
that get at something essential that can accompany
Robbins, Friedman, Johnson, & Franco

not only the kind of disclosure of truth that happens
in physics but also, say, engineering as you
mentioned, or art, poetry, theology, or ethics? That's
a job for phenomenology—not phenomenological
psychology, but phenomenological philosophy. This
is what is meant by the correspondence theory of
truth–a way of understanding truth that is implicit in
modern science, but also a very short-sighted way of
understanding truth. In other words, the essence of
truth has to be at least assumed before we can even
begin to ask whether physics gets at an essential
truth about the physical world. The latter question is
necessarily preliminary to the former.
Secondly, I disagree that phenomenology
results in a leveling-down of truth claims. Actually,
I would say that the modern tendency to leveldown truth-claims—and the correlative modern
relativism—is actually a by-product of the same
worldview that gives rise to modern science.
Modernism and post-modernism are like Siamese
twins, tied at the hip. In both cases, the question
of what truth claim is more valuable than another
truth claim hinges on the ontology of values, which
in the modern worldview is subordinated to fact.
The fact-value dichotomy is a result of the same
subject-object dichotomy that phenomenology
seeks to radically question and overcome. When
facts are split-off from values, then it literally
becomes impossible to determine which facts are
more valuable than others. Values actually just
creep in implicitly without being acknowledged
and so become a kind of unconscious dynamic
operating below the surface of any science, guiding
its activity, but all the while denied. It's easy to see
this in psychology—the examples of the DSM and
positive psychology are obvious ones—but more
difficult to see in physics. But look at the work of
Thomas Kuhn (1962), for example, and we can see a
similar dynamics going on in the history of physics.
The drama behind what facts get counted and which
ones get discounted is not unlike a soap opera,
guided by sets of competing values about what gets
to count as a fact and what does not, about what
methods get to count as legitimate methods, and so
on.
I think phenomenology provides the means
of overcoming the fact-value dichotomy and the
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

subject-object dualism that gives rise to it; therefore,
it provides a foundation in which different ways of
disclosing truth can be identified: variously, as more
important or less important, more legitimate and/
or less legitimate than others, but in a way that is
systematic and in the final analysis, demonstrable.
That is at least my hope because I do not believe
that phenomenology has accomplished this task yet,
though I believe in principle that phenomenology
is capable of doing this. I do not believe physics is
capable of doing it. However, I think the study of
physics and the examination of how the science
of physics is conducted—that is, how truth is
(implicitly) understood in physics as well as in other
fields—is very important for that project.
What is Thinking?
urthermore, one of Heidegger's (1954/1968) most
important works—and the most important work,
according to Heidegger himself—is translated as
"What is Called Thinking?" In that work, Heidegger
suggests that what calls-to-be-thought is what we
call thinking. Thinking itself is calling to be thought
about more deeply, more radically. The intentional
ambiguity in Heidegger’s title, in the German, lends
itself to two interpretations. On the one hand, “what
is called thinking” can be interpreted to mean asking
about what thinking is. On the other hand, Heidegger
is pointing toward a different type of thinking that
has been neglected, a type of meditative thought
that patiently waits for what calls to be thought
about. Whereas, rationality in Enlightenment-era,
modern thought has become comparatively violent,
imposing a kind of will-to-power on the world, in
a technological way. For example, Hubert Dreyfus
(1992), through the influence of Heidegger, was able
to show how the project of AI would fail because
it had not considered the way human thought
is integrally related to feeling, perception, and
embodiment.
Imaginative variation was not Heidegger's
notion, but Husserl’s (see Spiegelberg, 1982; see
also Giorgi, 2012). And I would not put imaginative
variation in a box with "thinking," because many
cognitive operations that go by the name "thinking"
are not anything like what Husserl (1913/2012) meant
by imaginative variation. Imaginative variation is

F
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much more specifically a process of varying the
constituents of a phenomenon and systematically
eliminating those variations which are not essential
to the phenomenon until, in principle, one is
left only with what cannot be varied without the
phenomenon ceasing to be what it is in its essence
(Giorgi, 2012).
Now, there is a certain sense that one
must already understand what the essence of a
phenomenon is if one is to "know" one has arrived at
the essence, once the analysis is complete. That's the
hermeneutic circle at play in the work—a catching
sight of how one always already understands the
phenomenon, but implicitly rather than explicitly
(Packer & Addison, 1989). Giorgi's (2009) approach,
in my opinion, did not acknowledge the hermeneutic,
interpretative dimensions of any description but
makes a distinction between interpretation and
description that is a false dichotomy (see Hein
& Austin, 2001). I see some of your remarks as
speaking to a similar concern although you seem
to often speak of psychic facts as if they were of the
same nature as factual things in the world, and that
is to confuse the noetic with the noematic structures
of consciousness, in my view.
H L F (5)
First, I am glad you and I agree that the
“distinction between interpretation and description
. . . is a false dichotomy.” (B. D. R., 5). I understand
this is one of the differences between Heidegger
and Husserl’s thought, so Giorgi appears aligned
with Husserl on this while we appear more to be
Heideggerian, though I approach my position from
a totally different tradition than phenomenology.
Second, you stated that “Heidegger suggests
that what calls to be thought is what we call thinking.
Thinking itself is calling to be thought about more
deeply, more radically.” I must admit I find this type
of phraseology to be tortuous. In some ways, the
phrasing appeals to me, stirring some interesting
reflections, but overall it makes me want to flee from
such twists and turns. In what sense does thinking,
a process of mentation, call “to be thought about
more deeply, more radically?” Is that not attributing
an anthropomorphic act, calling, to a limited
cognitive process, thinking? And is it not just simpler

to say, “one can think more deeply about thinking,
since that process involves many complexities and
even mysteries?” And why is Husserl’s imaginative
variation not a type of thinking? I can acknowledge
it is not equal to all the myriad possibilities of how
thought can operate, as you say, "because many
cognitive operations that go by the name ‘thinking’
are not anything like what Husserl meant by
imaginative variation."
But isn’t “a process of varying the
constituents of a phenomenon, and systematically
eliminating those variations that are not essential
to the phenomenon until, in principle, one is
left only with what cannot be varied without the
phenomenon ceasing to be what it is in its essence”
a systematic thought process, albeit just one among
many possible thought processes (which is my
protest, since I prefer my own idiosyncratic thought
processes to be more unconstrained as I cogitate
on stuff), as well as I think doomed to failure since
I do not believe in Husserl’s notion of essences, at
least as I understand his position on that: although
Husserl appeared to deny being an idealist, I
believe his notion of essences places him in this
camp as he privileges pure consciousness and deals
with phenomena as presented to consciousness
rather than as ontologically real. Thus, I interpret
his attempt to grasp essences as a movement away
from the phenomena as ontologically real and
toward idealism privileging subjectivity. Heidegger,
in this regard, seems to have made some advances
over Husserl, though I still have difficulty with many
of his positions.
In addition, you claim that I “seem to often
speak of psychic facts as if they were of the same
nature as factual things in the world, and that is to
confuse the noetic with the noematic structures
of consciousness.” I hope you can tell me where I
made this supposed error and we can discuss it. We
learn from our errors and I hope you can provide
a learning opportunity for me, although there is a
possibility that the learning could be reversed and
perhaps it is your error? Let’s see a nd not as a winlose contest, but as a mutual exploration for our
common betterment.
Although I might preface this request to
explore a supposed confusion with the observation

152 International Journal of Transpersonal Studies

Robbins, Friedman, Johnson, & Franco

that I find the distinction between noesis and noema
abstruse, so these probably need to be explicated
from your point of view before we can talk about
whether or not I am confused. If you interpret these
simply as subject/experience/meaning and object/
experienced/meant respectively, as some do, I
would simply question why use such uncommon
language, if not to obfuscate, and suggest we talk
in more common terms. But, if you use these terms
in a more complex and specified way, perhaps
invoking these terms may be useful and I can learn
to converse in this language, unless they violate my
sense of proper order (if so, maybe we could then
create some new language that would be more
mutually satisfying). From Husserl’s perspective, and
grant that I am working from memory dating back
over 4 decades since I last read Husserl, noema
are not ontologically real, but more akin to Platonic
forms and therefore not “factual.”
One reason I am engaging in this discussion
is I want to understand the possible potential of
phenomenological thought/language to bridge
various dualities for which I have no language
to express now. One possible solution to my
quest might be in Husserl’s correlation of noetic/
noematic, as well as in a deeper understanding of
Dasein as a holistic expression of unity. However,
where I am really befuddled on this topic is putting
phenomenology into action, as in research. I
see phenomenological studies as not solving the
problems of dualisms with which I struggle, but only
working the more subjective side of dualities. In that
regard, I appreciate their potential to dialectically
complement more quantitative studies working the
more objective side—and, using both can give a
more comprehensive understanding. I think your
mixed methods paper in The Humanistic Psychologist
did this marvelously (Robbins & Vandree, 2009).
But how this approach could possibly bridge these
dualities alone, such as through correlating noetic/
noematic and approaching an understanding of
Dasein, in practice eludes me. Is that possible and,
if so, how?
B D R (6)
Yes, traditionally, Husserl and Heidegger have
been commented upon as differing in their projects.
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

Husserl, founder of transcendental phenomenology,
sought to arrive at a de-contextualized, neo-Platonic
essence. Heidegger, founder of hermeneutic
phenomenology, aimed to explicate what is always
already understood as being lived through as beingin-the-world. At the same time, Husserl's thinking
was dynamic and changed considerably over the
course of his life and I think as his work evolved
over time it was moving in the same direction as
Heidegger's insights (see, e.g., Crowell, 2001; Barua,
2007; Overgaard, 2004).
As for Heidegger's turn of phrase, "What
is Called Thinking? (Was heisst denken?),” it is a
pun, a play on words, and does not translate into
English well; hence, the reason it seems "tortured"
in English. Maybe it seems tortured in German too,
I don't know. But the pun is what matters here. The
question can be interpreted as either "What is called
thinking?" or "What calls for thinking?" If we phrased
it differently, it would lose the word-play Heidegger
is engaged in here. The key to the text, and the key
to understand what Heidegger means by what he
sometimes calls "meditative thinking" (as opposed
to "calculative thinking") is to understand the
importance of the play between the two questions
implied in the ambiguous title.
The key passage in this text is the following:
"Most thought-provoking in our thought-provoking
time is that we are still not thinking" (Heidegger,
1954/1968, p. 6). As Stark (1998) has suggested,
this passage can be understood best by analyzing
the three major components of the sentence: "most
thought provoking," "in our thought provoking time,"
and "we are still not thinking." What does Heidegger
mean by saying "most thought provoking" in the
above passage? By asking what is most thought
provoking, surely, Heidegger is implying that to
begin thinking at all, one must always already be
engaged with something that provokes thought.
To think, that is, is already to think about that
which most calls for thinking. Indeed, Heidegger is
saying as well that one is not thinking if one has
not already considered thinking of that which is
worthy of thought. With that said, we can clarify the
ambiguity of Heidegger's title. Heidegger means to
playfully demonstrate that even to begin addressing
the question of what thinking is called, one must
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also answer at the same time the question of what
calls for thinking (see Robbins, 2014).
Heidegger's point, as subtle or tortured as it
may be, is quite revolutionary in that it contradicts
most contemporary theories of rationality. Such
theories of rationality typically consider thinking
to be a matter of following the correct method.
In other words, thinking becomes reduced to a
“rationality” that is a means to an end: thinking, that
is, is reduced to instrumental or calculative reason.
Yet such a calculative reason is oblivious to the allimportant question (for Heidegger) that asks what
one's thinking should be about. The about-ness
of calculative rationality is taken for granted (note:
Look at how similar this insight is to Husserl's notion
of intentionality).
The calculative rationalizing philosopher
is thoughtless with regard to what is most worthy
of thought. To put it in the terms of Max Weber
(1922/1978), we can translate Heidegger to be
saying that instrumental rationality as a means to
an end always already implies a substantive rational
end to the instrumental method. But instrumental
rationality remains oblivious of and thoughtless in
regard to what it is calculating about. In essence,
such a calculative rationality would inevitably
degenerate into a vicious circle of calculations merely
for the sake of calculations. Indeed, it is just such a
calculative circularity that is the descriptive of what
Heidegger calls the Gestell, the technological world
that orders merely for the sake of further ordering
and in which things and persons are disclosed
merely as resources standing by awaiting further
ordering (Heidegger, 1971b). Sounds like most 20th
century psychology, doesn't it? But Heidegger's text
reveals that there are other ways to understand what
it means to think—and he aims to recover a Greek
sense of thinking—and an attending to Being—that
he believes has been lost to us, at our own detriment.
He will make a distinction, for example, between
thinking as speaking and thinking as gathering (see
Robbins, 2014)—but that would take some time to
lay out, so I will leave it for now.
Whether imaginative variation is a type
of "thinking" depends on what one means by the
term "thinking." If one is prone to make a distinction
between thinking and perceiving, for example, then

I would say it is more than a type of thinking —
it is a type of imaginative perception. When one
is engaged in imaginative variation, the variations
are experientially varied. One is varying the
phenomenon's possibilities with the aim to identify
which of those possibilities are essential to the
phenomenon's identity.
Is this an impossible task once one is no
longer engaged in transcendental phenomenology?
It can still be done, and the task is still a worthy one,
in my opinion, because the essence is not a Platonic
essence, but a situated essence. The "essence" in
this sense is an explicit articulation of an implicitly
understood phenomenon as it is lived out prethematically within a life-world context. The essence
is situated, contextual, and not universal or eternal
(yet, at the same time, not arbitrary). So, one has
to keep in mind that the term "essence," if retained
within a hermeneutic process, has to take on a very
different meaning. And if that is confusing, perhaps
a better word is in order, and I have not come up
with one that really works. The term "archetype"
has the same import as "essence," and so does not
solve the problem. I somewhat like Goethe's term
"Ur-phenomenon" (see Robbins, 2006).
With regard to the noesis/noema: this
distinction between noesis and noema does not map
onto the subject-object duality as we use "subjective"
and "objective" conventionally. It is, on the contrary,
an attempt like Heidegger's being-in-the-world to
transcend that dualism. This is difficult to define in
the abstract, because it is best understood in the
practice of phenomenology. Nothing in the English
language does it justice. A key to understanding the
noesis/noema distinction is to understand Husserl's
notion of intentionality (Husserl, 1913/2012; see also
Drummond, 2012; Duranti, 1999; Føllesdal, 1969;
Sartre, 1939/2014; Smith & McIntyre, 1982; Zahavi,
2004). Intentionality is the term Husserl uses to
designate an essential structure of consciousness—
that it is always about something. Consciousness
is never just consciousness and nothing else. It is
always consciousness of something. This is very
similar to Heidegger's reflections on thinking,
no? Thinking is always already about something.
Thinking doesn't become radical until it questions
the very grounds for thinking about anything. That's
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Heidegger's point, and his point is roughly the same
sentiment as Husserl's, as I understand it.
Thus, given that intentionality is the structure
of consciousness, then we can say that anything
that is given to consciousness is going to involve
(a) that which is being disclosed to consciousness
(e.g. the perceptual field), and also (b) the activity
of consciousness by which the former is disclosed.
That which is being disclosed to consciousness,
(a), is the noema, and the acts of consciousness
by which the former is disclosed, (b), is the noesis.
The noesis is only disclosed indirectly via a special
attitude toward the noema (the phenomenological
reduction, or in other words, the bracketing of the
natural attitude).
Let's take embarrassment as a case in point
(Robbins & Vandree, 2009). When I am embarrassed,
the noema is the appearance of one's self through
the eyes of the other as exposed or revealed in a
way that is unwanted. This is the "life-world" of
embarrassment. It is the noema of embarrassment:
that which is disclosed to consciousness when one
is embarrassed. By describing this life-world of
embarrassment, we can then indirectly identify the
conditions necessary for consciousness to be able to
disclose this kind of life-world. For example, we can
identify through the life-world of embarrassment
how consciousness includes the capacity to
constitute itself through the imaginative projection
into another person's point-of-view. In other words,
consciousness has the noetic capacity for empathy
and this empathic ability is a necessary condition
for embarrassment. This can be corroborated by
developmental research that shows that empathy
and embarrassment appear at about the same age
developmentally in children (Bischof-Kohler, 1991;
Eisenberg, 2000; Lewis, Sullivan, Stanger, & Weiss,
1989).
It is easy to confuse noesis and noema.
Where I see confusion in this conversation is, for
example, when there is discussion of language (or
other contextual factors) acting as a "mediator"
between the scientist/investigator and the structure
of consciousness. In phenomenology, there is no
"mediator" between the noesis and the noema,
because they are two sides of the same coin—
this is not a causal relationship. It is not that we
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

have consciousness or subjectivity and then
objectivity, and the things are mediating the
relationship between the two. If anything, both
noesis and noema would be situated on the side of
"subjectivity." But of course saying this would put
us into the problem of solipsism, because clearly
noema is not merely subjective, it is also revealing
of things that transcend consciousness. To perform
phenomenology adequately, therefore, one must
begin by suspending any judgment about what is or
is not subjective or objective and instead attend to
how the noema can inform us about the noetic acts
of consciousness. What transcends consciousness is
not at issue as much as the structure of consciousness
itself in Husserlian phenomenology. The problem
of language is tricky, but for now, suffice it to say
that within the context of the phenomenological
reduction, language is part of the noetic acts of
consciousness by which the noema is able to appear
as it does, and so is not a mediator as much as a
medium by which consciousness does what it does
in the process of disclosing a world.
H L F (6)
Reading these guys puts Occam’s razor to
shame, as one needs a heavy samurai sword, not a
mere razor, to cut through these Gordian knots. It
seems, at least on the surface, that there are some
tautologies in this strand of reasoning. If the answer
is implied in the question, as Socrates demonstrated
in Plato’s Meno (but through leading questions),
then the hare can indeed never catch the tortoise,
per Meno’s paradox. Yet we know this paradox is
invalid. Cannot thinking lead to new knowledge and
be serendipitous, as opposed to being pre-ordained
toward an object without exception—as in nondirected meditation or contemplation?
You said, for example, "But instrumental
rationality remains oblivious of and thoughtless in
regard to what it is calculating about. . . .Sounds
like most 20th century psychology, doesn't it?" (B.
D. R., 6). Not really. I can see value in distinguishing
calculative rationality, as in what a computer
can perform, from other sorts of thinking. But
Heidegger’s notion of thinking seems quite different
from modern cognitive approaches, which offer
great insight not yet known in Heidegger’s day. You
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said, "But Heidegger's text reveals that there are
other ways to understand what it means to think . .
. . He will make a distinction, for example, between
thinking as speaking and thinking as gathering” (B.
D. R., 6). You also said: "imaginative variation . .
. . is varying the phenomenon's possibilities with
the aim to identify which of those possibilities are
essential to the phenomenon's identity" (B. D. R., 6).
Ah, now here is something I can bite into. Simply
put, I consider perception to be part of thinking, as
in selective perception requiring some implicit, if
not conscious, thought. But I do not want to go too
far into this now.
You said, "Is this an impossible task once
one is no longer engaged in transcendental
phenomenology? . . . I sort of like Goethe's term,
'Ur-phenomenon'" (B. D. R., 6). Now if we are going
to define essence in a non-platonic way, I will have
to think about what it might mean. And Goethe’s
term helps me not at all. Could we discuss in simpler
ways, such as you telling me what you think essence
means in this Heideggerian fashion.
You said, the "distinction between noesis
and noema does not map onto the subject-object
duality as we use "subjective" and "objective"
conventionally" (B. D. R., 6). I do note that many
define noesis/noema as reflecting the perceiving
subject and the perceived object, so you are
obviously using it in a special phenomenological
way. You said, “It is, on the contrary, an attempt, like
Heidegger's being-in-the-world, to transcend that
dualism” (B. D. R., 6). Now we are getting closer to
where I want to explore. You said, “This is difficult to
define in the abstract, because it is best understood
in the practice of phenomenology. Nothing in the
English language does it justice” (B. D. R., 6). Yikes!
We can’t talk about this in English? What about the
notion that all natural languages are fluid enough to
express any thought that can be expressed in any
natural language. And German, through different
from English, isn’t that different. It’s not like translating
a word from Hopi to English, after all. I must concede,
this is why I attempted to read these guys in German
years ago, since I hit this semantic wall. Reading
the German did not help. Maybe I should rely on
secondary sources, but I rarely trust them. You said,
"A key to understanding the noesis/noema distinction

is to understand Husserl's notion of intentionality.
. . . It is always consciousness of something" (B.
D. R., 6). I can go with this, though I am not sure
there is no pure consciousness (as in lucid deep
dreamless sleep or certain meditative states). You
said, “Thinking is always already about something.
Thinking doesn't become radical until it questions
the very grounds for thinking about anything” (B. D.
R., 6). I do not see that as radical, just another topic
for thought. You said, “That which is being disclosed
to consciousness, (a), is the noema, and the acts of
consciousness by which the former is disclosed, (b),
is the noesis” (B. D. R., 6). How is this not simply
the object of experience and the subjectivity as a
process of the experiencer, respectively?
You said, "The noesis is only disclosed
indirectly via . . . the bracketing of the natural
attitude" (B. D. R., 6). Becoming aware of how we
process our experience seems knowable, but only
to some degree in my opinion—as much occurs in
deep biological ways that do not seem amenable to
any conscious knowing. Also, this seems different
from how I’ve understood the phenomenological
reduction, which is as a reduction of the object to
its essence (whatever that is?). And not involving the
subjective process, but I have heard of a distinction
between transcendent and non-transcendent
phenomenology, so you must be talking here about
only one version of this. In addition, we are learning
so much now on how thinking occurs through
scientific advances, such as in neuroscience, that it
seems any bracketing to get to this is possibly futile
(e.g., some unconscious processes occur much
quicker than consciousness can follow).
You said, "When I am embarrassed, the
noema is the appearance of one's self through the
eyes of the other as exposed in a way that is unwanted.
This is the "life-world" of embarrassment" (B. D. R.,
6). It makes sense to talk about a person’s life-world,
but does an experience, like embarrassment, have a
life-world? That makes me uncomfortable. You said,
"It is the noema of embarrassment . . . . This can
be corroborated by developmental research which
shows that empathy and embarrassment appear at
about the same age developmentally in children" (B.
D. R., 6). Now this is another concept to which I
can relate, as so-called objective research on the
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development of empathy can be used to show that it
occurs at the same time as embarrassment begins to
be experienced—yes, I know some of these studies.
So imaginative projection might lead to entertaining
notions shown by development research. Just some
good old-fashioned theorizing, as is abundant in
the embarrassment vs. shame literature—much of it
psychoanalytic, which arrived at these notions in a
simpler way. What does phenomenology offer that
these do not? You said, "It is easy to confuse noesis
and noema. . . . there is no 'mediator' between the
noesis and the noema, because they are two sides of
the same coin—this is not a causal relationship" (B.
D. R., 6). My claim for mediation here is not to claim
causation, but only reciprocal relatedness—and
this does not contradict that these are inextricably
inter-related, only they use more dualistic language.
But noesis/noema together are also dualistic, so
what advantage is gained by their use? Actually, I
see one advantage, but it is not one I like, namely
that by denying the noema any ontological reality,
there can be a consistent idealism without having to
proffer inner/outer dualities, as it all can be held as
inner or subjective. As much as I dislike mind-body
dualisms, I dislike all idealisms and all materialisms
even more. Am I missing something big here?
Last here, is this a confusion on my part or
simply our attempt to communicate using different
concepts/languages and underlying assumptions? I
reckon that neither of us are to the point of being
confused more than the other, but both are likely
in a state of partial knowing of the other’s thoughts.
And I am discovering my own thoughts better
as we explore. You said, "It is not that we have
consciousness or subjectivity and then objectivity
. . . both noesis and noema would be situated on
the side of 'subjectivity'" (B. D. R., 6). Yes—and this
may be an advantage in terms of consistency, but
not in terms of veridicality with an outside world
seen as also real and requiring engagement. You
said, “But of course saying this would put us into
the problem of solipsism, because clearly noema is
not merely subjective, it is also revealing of things
that transcend consciousness” (B. D. R., 6). Ah,
here is a rub! How is it revealing of the world if
it is, after all, just appearance within consciousness
and contact is never “substantial”? You said, "To
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

perform phenomenology adequately, therefore, one
must . . . attend to how the noema can inform us
about the noetic acts of consciousness" (B. D. R.,
6). But what does the noema have to say about the
external world, not just noetic acts? You said, “What
transcends consciousness is not at issue as much as
the structure of consciousness itself, in Husserlian
phenomenology.” Ah, for Husserl, the world is less
important. But then why did Giorgi (2009) go to
pains to argue that there are essences in learning to
ride a bicycle?
You said, "The problem of language is tricky
. . . a medium by which consciousness does what
it does in the process of disclosing a world" (B. D.
R., 6). I’ll have to chew on this distinction between
language as mediator v. medium. But language, it
seems, would only be a medium in trying to know
another who also uses language—for knowing a nonlanguaging being, it seems it would be a cognitive
tool or mediator. And, just as I am hampered in
understanding Heidegger by not being fluent in
German and missing his jokes, my language is quite
a problem in terms of getting to any noetic acts of
consciousness if it does not include these concepts.
Perhaps I can only do phenomenology if I already
know how to do phenomenology? Meanwhile, you
never addressed my practical question directly:
"How this approach could possibly bridge these
dualities . . . through correlating noetic/noematic
and approaching an understanding of Dasein . . .
Is that possible and, if so, how?" (H. L. F., 5). Could
you take this on?
The Importance of Being to Thought
B D R (7)
It requires a certain degree of masochism
to read Husserl and Heidegger. But also, yes, their
work is tricky because there is a certain degree
of circularity. But it is not a vicious circle—rather
a hermeneutic one. I think of phenomenology as
more like a Chinese finger trap. When one relaxes
into the correct attitude, the cuff slips off with ease.
Or it's like a fly in a bottle. The bottle keeps trying
to go sideways and no matter which way he turns,
he bounces off the glass. But all he has to do is
go straight up and out the bottle he goes (thanks,
Wittgenstein).
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In one sense, all of Western epistemology
has been, in one form of another, a (failed) attempt
to resolve Zeno's (not our co-author Z. F.) paradox.
That's the fly bottle referred to above. Heidegger, I
think, is pointing up and saying, "Hey, look up there
at that hole." It sounds like tautology, but it's a way
out of the traditional tautologies through entering
the circularity in the right way, hermeneutically via
phenomenology.
Heidegger is not saying we are "preordained toward an object without exception" and
in fact is saying quite the contrary. He's pointing out
that our understanding of things is contingent and
has changed with history and not in a good way. He
thinks there is a special danger in our technological
age—a danger of losing our ability to truly think
what is most worthy of thought—the question
of Being. For this reason, Heidegger (1954/1968)
spends the last several lectures of his Was Heisst
Denken? addressing a single fragment of text written
by the pre-Socratic Greek thinker Parmenides. The
fragment reads, "One should both say and think that
Being is" (p. 168). Clearly, the fragment indicates an
intimate connection between thinking and Being, a
notion that carries over (not without some loss of
clarity) into the thought of Plato and Aristotle.
In that same essay, Heidegger (1954/1968)
refers to Socrates as "the purest thinker of the
West" (p. 17) for his sense that thinking (if it is to be
genuine thinking) is already directed towards order,
goodness, beauty, truth and Being. In like manner,
with Aristotle we find a thinking that understands
the world as teleologically striving towards the
ideal. Human beings as thinkers strive toward the
excellence of the highest being by thinking about
thinking. The Greeks thought that for human beings,
thinking is most thought-worthy. But, in our age,
what is most thought-provoking, says Heidegger, is
that we are not thinking.
So, when Heidegger (1954/1968) wrote “in
our thought-provoking time” (p. 6), he was referring
not just to the current events of the day, but to our
age as the epoch of the Gestell. In our time, we are
still not thinking and, in this context, Heidegger
refers to Nietzsche's (1883/2016) diagnosis of our
age as a time of nihilism: “The wasteland grows.” If it
is Being that most calls for thought, what most calls

to be thought about in our age is the forgetting or
withdrawal of Being and it is due to the withdrawal
of Being that we are still not thinking. In contrast to
Hegel's notion of history, Heidegger's is a history
wherein we find ourselves increasingly fallen from
and more distant from Being. Being withdraws in
our technological age as the experience of thinking
is reduced to calculative rationality. “Thinking”
has become the experience of using rationality as
a device to operate on a world of things already
reified into a network of pre-defined ends—and so,
ironically, is tautologous because it always finds what
it has already calculated it will find in advance since
that is what thinking has been reduced to. In our
age, says Heidegger, ratio has trumped legein. The
thoughtlessness of calculative rationality threatens
to obliterate the possibility for being-thoughtful.
When Heidegger (1954/1968) wrote that
“we are still not thinking” (p. 6) he meant that
humans are not thinking upon that which is most
thought-worthy, namely Being. He argued as
well that humans shall continue to miss what is
thought-worthy if they continue to use thinking
as a technological device rather than thinking of
thinking as thoughtful dwelling. Unless our thinking
is rooted in the being-thoughtful of dwelling, then
our thinking remains homeless. What it means to
dwell as being-thoughtful Heidegger attempted to
illuminate by tracing what was lost in translation
when the Greek word for thinking, legein, was
translated into the Latin, ratio. He found that two
significations for legein are not found in ratio: a)
thinking as speaking and b) thinking as gathering.
Thinking as speaking is a speaking and
thinking which is attuned to how Being calls for
thinking in language. The address or language
of Being is historical, not historiological, in that it
arises out of the sending of Being. So when legein is
translated into ratio and when ratio, for instance, is
taken up as Vernuft and Grund (Reason and Being?)
in history, no human being made such decisions
per se, but rather "language itself is speaking to us,"
(Caputo, 1986, p. 73). Philosophy and hence thinking
have historically been translated into the language of
"reason" which covers over the more fundamental
sense of what serves as its primal source. In the
Latin ratio, there is no obvious connection between
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thinking and Being. Yet, when ratio is traced back
to legein, from which Logos is derived, Heidegger
(1957/1974) found that it means “to collect together,”
“to lay one thing beside another,” and “to arrange
one thing after another” (p. 178). Thus, one finds that
second meaning of legein as a gathering.
Heidegger (1957/1974) wrote, “Legein and
logos are the letting lie forward of a thing which
comes to presence in its presence,” (p. 179). What
for the Greek is that-which-comes-to-presence-in-itspresence? It is the being in its Being; thus, "logos
means Being" (p. 179). Thinking as gathering, then,
is the gathering of Being. Heidegger (1959/1971a)
wrote, “Thinking cuts furrows into the soil of Being”
(p. 70). What calls for thinking then tells us what is
called thinking: thinking is called a gathering for it
gathers what is called to be gathered. What calls to
be gathered? Being-thoughtful!
Yes, of course, all of this sounds as though
it is circular logic going nowhere, but with proper
reflection one can see how Heidegger meditatively
deepened what it means to think and in that sense
performed the process of thinking. Heidegger
showed how to think even as he showed how
thinking is a showing, a presence or gathering of
what calls to be thought. Heidegger demonstrated
how being-thoughtful is not a matter of performing a
method of mental activity that is applied to get from
point A to point B. On the contrary, he showed how
being-thoughtful is an encounter with Being.
As mentioned above, legein and logos are
the "letting lie forward of the thing which comes to
presence in the presence" (Heidegger, 1957/1974,
p. 17). Regarding that which lies forward (das
Verliegende), it is the upon-which that forms the
basis for "properties" and the about-which that one
may speak. In this sense, logos also means "ground."
Hence, when one says logos in the Greek sense,
one speaks in the same breath of Being and ground.
Thus, Heraclitus said, "If you have heard not me,
but the logos, then it is wise to say accordingly:
all is one" (as cited in Caputo, 1986, p. 79). But
this early Greek understanding of the belonging
together of Being and ground becomes, in time,
corrupted. Historically, the belonging together of
Being and ground was forgotten. As Caputo (1986)
explained:
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

Instead of being thought together with Being,
ground becomes a determination of the being,
and the search is undertaken to find the ground
of one being in another. Thus, there is born
the whole enterprise of "onto-theological," of
"metaphysics," of philosophy itself as a rational
inquiry into the cause of things. Things now must
be founded upon the solid and firm foundation
of a causal explanation. The self-evidence
validity of this rational search for causes rests
upon the now no longer heard ringing together
of the unity of Being and ground in the Greek
word logos. (p. 79; see also Goff, 1972)
In short, philosophy “as a thing of reason” is the
consequence of the fall from the original early Greek
sense that "the thing lies forth of itself, that it rises up
and stands before us on its own grounds” (Caputo,
1986, p. 79). Take Nietzsche, for example, whose
will-to-power has its roots in this oblivion, by which
the history of Western thought becomes an attempt
to submit things to human reason for certifying its
existence.
In contrast to the calculative reason that
derives from the severance of Being from its grounds
in Western thought, meditative thinking is a thinking
that leaves metaphysics alone. It is a thinking that,
instead, is called to think upon that which lies forth
of itself without why—that is, without grounds. As
Heidegger (1957/1974) wrote: "Insofar as Being it, it
itself has no ground. Yet this is not so because it
is self-grounded, but rather because every form of
grounding, even and precisely that [which occurs]
through itself, remains inappropriate to Being as
ground" (p. 185).
Being, that is, cannot be explained upon
grounds outside of itself. On the contrary to thinking,
one must let Being be: let it lie forth (legein) and
emerge of itself (physis).]
You said, “I’m not sure I buy this.” I am not
sure what you are not buying. You say this in the
context of the discussion of calculative reason's
inability to think its own ground in Being. In response
to the claim that the calculative rationalizing
philosopher is thoughtless about what is most
worthy of thought: Well, they are not thoughtful but
in a specific sense—not in the sense of thinking that
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Heidegger re-claimed from the Greeks. Philosophy
is thoughtless in the sense that it is without legein.
Here is a very revealing passage from Heidegger's
(1977/1993) "The Origin of the Work of Art":

H. L. F., you said: "Now if we are going to define
essence in a non-platonic way, I will have to think
about what it might mean. . . . in this Heideggerian
fashion" (H. L. F., 6). In response to your questions
about a non-Platonic essence, here Heidegger meant
the condition of possibility for a phenomenon's
givenness, or being. For example, the essence of
truth is the revealing-concealing advent of Being.
Dasein's essence is Being-in-the-world, etc. Sure
we can talk about this in English. The point is that
one learns phenomenology primarily by doing it.
Until the language of phenomenology is put into
practice, the words retain an essential obscurity, like
any new vocabulary. In response to your question
about consciousness, for Husserl there is no pure
consciousness. Consciousness is, in its essence,
directional, relational, about something. One can of
course argue otherwise, although I think it would be
a difficult case to make.
What I mean when I say "radical" is that
it gets to the roots or ground of something. The

term radical is derived from the Latin, radix, “root.”
Thinking about thinking is more radical than thinking
about something other than thinking, because in
the case of the former thinking is undergoing an
inquiry into its own ground, or roots, or origins. But
it is also "radical" in the sense that, per Heidegger,
thinking does not typically think about its own
grounds, Being. So, it is also radical in the sense
of a dramatic change from the status quo – since if
Heidegger is correct, thinking as legein and logos
has been forgotten and Being, therefore, has been
lost to thought. To reverse that trend of history is
to engage in radical philosophy (or so Heidegger
claims).
You seem to treat consciousness as if it
were a thing, in ways that are contrary to the
phenomenological reduction of Husserl and the beingin-the-world of Heidegger. Phenomenologically
speaking—within the phenomenological reduction
and when bracketing the natural attitude—the
noetic pole of consciousness is not given directly
in experience in the way biological processes are
given. There is no way that one can discover noetic
acts of consciousness by looking at someone's MRI,
for example. It can only be discovered through the
first-person experience of a conscious being and in
that case it appears indirectly through the givenness
of the world and the world-horizon within which
the world is disclosed. Dasein is its disclosedness
and (within the framework of phenomenology)
this disclosedness cannot be reduced to biological
processes because biological processes have their
being by virtue of their givenness as they are
disclosed through Dasein.
Historically, there have been cultures in
which the human soul and experience was thought
to originate with the heart rather than the brain. This
is another way to illustrate how the brain is not given
as a noetic act of consciousness in the act of living
out some experience. The brain is given as a source
of consciousness only as a noematic content of
consciousness. Otherwise, it would be self-evident
that the brain is the source of experience and yet it
is not given as such (see Robbins, 2013; Robbins &
Gordon, 2014).
Likewise, when you said that “neuroscience”
can get to “unconscious processes [that] occur much
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Occasionally, we still have the feeling that
violence has long been done to the thingly
[sic] element of things and that thought has
played a part in this violence, for which reason
people disavow thought instead of taking pains
to make it more thoughtful. But in defining the
essence of the thing, what is the use of a feeling,
however certain, if thought alone has the right
to speak here? Perhaps, however, what we call
feeling or mood, here and in similar instances,
is more reasonable—that is, more intelligently
perceptive—because more open to Being
than all that reason which, having meanwhile
become ratio, was misinterpreted as being
rational. The hankering after the irrational, as
abortive offspring of the unthought rational,
therewith performed a curious service. To be
sure, the current thing-concept always fits each
thing. Nevertheless, it does not lay hold of the
thing as it is in its own being, but makes an
assault upon it. (pp. 150-151)

quicker than consciousness can follow,” this is not
something of great concern to phenomenology, as I
understand it. The noetic pole of consciousness is not
an objective datum, it is a condition of possibility for
any “objective datum” to be what it is in its givenness
as something that matters and is of concern enough
to think and be concerned about. Phenomenology
can appreciate that human beings are embodied
and that human bodies have biological processes
that can be discovered through a peculiar style of
disclosing biological entities and processes, which
we all know through our education. Phenomenology
simply recognizes that these biological processes
are not noetic acts of consciousness that can be
discovered using the phenomenological method.
Although, the noetic structure of consciousness as it
is revealed through phenomenology is essential if we
are to (a) have any science, including neuroscience,
and (b) understanding the meaning of findings in
neuroscience in ways that do not depend too heavily
on the messy speculations of folk wisdom.
You stated with regard to my discussion of
embarrassment that you were uncomfortable with
the idea that an experience (i.e., embarrassment)
might have a life-world. This was a way of saying that
within a certain cultural context, and within certain
conventions of the use of the term “embarrassment”
as it is implicitly understood by naive reporters,
embarrassment can be understood as the disclosure
of a particular world of significance, with a structural
regularity that can be seen across a wide variety of
people. This is revealed not by explicit definitions
given by participants, but is disclosed indirectly
(noematically) in their descriptive narratives of
personal experiences of embarrassment written from
a first-person perspective. The phenomenologist, in
examining this data, has the task of identifying the
noetic structures that are revealed indirectly through
these various narrative descriptions. Embarrassment,
then, has both a noetic aspect (the acts of
consciousness that make embarrassment possible)
and a noematic aspect (a certain style by which the
world is disclosed through these acts of consciousness
we call embarrassment). Phenomenology need
not assume singularity either (e.g., your suggestion
that I was looking at embarrassment as a unitary
structure); although in Giorgi's (2009) method the
Can Subject-Object Dualism Be Reconciled?

idea is to assimilate any singularities into a general
structure that can accommodate all varieties of a
phenomenon under one general category. This is
not always possible or desirable.
My point was simply to illustrate noesis and
noema, using embarrassment as an example. What
is new is the noema and noesis concepts, which are
not there in developmental research nor dynamic
theories of embarrassment. No one knows what an
emotion or mood is, especially the developmental
psychologists, and the psychodynamic theories
are not much better off. Yes, they define emotions
and moods, but they are superficial definitions
and do not get at the roots of what an emotion
is. Phenomenology has an answer to what they
cannot explain. You wrote: “My claim for mediation
here is not to claim causation, but only reciprocal
relatedness—and this does not contradict these
are inextricably inter-related, only they use more
dualistic language” (H. L. F., 6). The term "mediator"
suggests otherwise to me. I understand this term
to mean a variable that is directly related to two
variables that are also related to one another, but
not directly. The mediator explains the relationship.
For example, there is a positive relationship between
sexually transmitted illness and phone sex. But these
variables are not directly related; their relationship is
mediated by a third variable: sexual motivation.
In Husserlian phenomenology, we're not
dealing with consciousness and its objects as
“variables,” as if they are separate events that can
be related. Rather, consciousness as an activity is
revealed through that which is given to consciousness
as a world, and even what is transcendent of
consciousness is revealed as transcendent by an
act of consciousness. This is not solipsism. Things
are revealed as being other than consciousness by
virtue of the way they are given to consciousness—
for example, as always given from a perspective and
as always in the process of being revealed partially
rather than completely within the world horizon,
etc.
You asked: “But noesis/noema are also
dualistic, so what advantage is gained by their use?”
They are not a classic duality, because noesis and
noema are not separate events or entities. The acts
of consciousness (noetic structures) are given to
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consciousness indirectly through the manner in which
these acts are revealed through the appearance of the
world in its givenness (noematic structure). You also
said, "I see one advantage, but it is not one I like . . . by
denying the noema any ontological reality, there can
be a consistent idealism . . . as it all can be held as inner
or subjective" (H. L. F., 6). This is a misunderstanding.
Noema and noesis cannot be reduced to subjectivity
nor to objectivity. As I stated before, these terms do
not map onto the subject-object duality. Let me try
a different example. Let's take an ambiguous figure,
such as the well-known duck-rabbit illusion image
("Kaninchen und Ente", n.d.).
When you see the rabbit, then the rabbit
is the noematic content of consciousness. But this
content is also revealed against a background—a
horizon that recedes into the background as the
image emerges into the foreground of perception.
Then, I see the duck. Now, the duck is the noematic
content of consciousness. Now I can switch back
and forth. Duck, rabbit, duck, rabbit, etc. The act
of switching between duck and rabbit is an act of
consciousness—it is noetic. But as an aspect of the
noesis, it is not directly given in the duck-rabbit
display, but revealed in the way the duck-rabbit
figure shows itself, through the switching back and
forth at will from duck to rabbit and back again.
The noesis is not some object over and
against the duck-rabbit ambiguous figure. It is the
acts by which the duck-rabbit image can appear
as it does to awareness in the very way that it
appears. The duck-rabbit is also revealed as having
a transcendent being that is not reducible to “my
consciousness,” because, for example, I cannot
change its appearance at will beyond the two
ambiguously held figures of duck and rabbit. I
hold out for the possibility that it could be seen,
potentially, in ways other than as a duck or rabbit.
For example, when constituted as such, it can come
to appear more like the map of a park seen from
above, or a patch of wood behind a white wall's
broken plaster.
Conclusion
n this dialogue, B. D. R. and H. L. F. have
attempted to elucidate phenomenology’s claims
that it should be foundational to scientific investi-

gation and offers a phenomenological solution
to the thorny problem of subject/object dualism
plaguing transpersonal psychology and beyond.
The interlocutors challenge each other and the
readers to examine the fundamental concepts of
phenomenology, such as noesis and noema, and
their relevance to transpersonal psychology and
science as a whole. B. D. R. proposes and defends
the proposition that phenomenology is foundational
to science and knowing. Phenomenology provides
a means to describe and understand the implicit
assumptions and parameters of any field of study
or way of knowing. That is, it provides a means
to radically interrogate the essential meaning of a
thing by making its assumptions and framework
explicit. Without clarifying these, any truth
endeavor, whether in physics or psychology, may
be limited and misled by faulty preconceptions
and unexamined assumptions thus challenging the
validity and quality of its knowledge. B.D.R. argues
that phenomenology provides an approach for
seeking the essential meaning structures of science
and any of its subfields such as physics, psychology,
and the transpersonal. Moreover, phenomenology
seeks a solid grasp of what the object or experience
under investigation truly is and truly means. That
is, what makes it this certain type of thing and not
another thing? What are the essential elements and
attributes of this phenomenon? For the transpersonal
psychologists, what distinguishes the transpersonal
(or the spiritual, transcendent, etc.) from some other
type of experience? Phenomenology provides the
researcher with tools to describe and understand
the limitations, extent, and meaning of phenomena
such as altered states of consciousness, near-death
experiences, and the like. This in-depth critical
analysis is how phenomenology is foundational to
scientific endeavor and is what so often gets ignored
or dismissed in the pursuit of knowledge.
B. D. R. also addresses several common
misconceptions of phenomenology such as the
idea that phenomenology is the study of subjective
experiences. He also attempts to clarify Heidegger’s
proposition that phenomenology is a unique
and important type of thinking—an approach
that precedes calculative or rational thinking by
illuminating what is worthy of contemplation. H. L.
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F. provides an important and useful inquiry that helps
elucidate these significant and often misunderstood
qualities of phenomenology. In the end, he holds to
his skepticism about this solution.
In sum, this dialogue has explored how some
of the basic concepts of phenomenology might
provide an important foundation to scientific studies
and indeed to all knowing in human experience,
including transpersonal studies. This dialogue also
highlights how phenomenology offers a solution
to the subject/object dualism that transpersonal
investigators often find vexing but difficult to
surmount. B. D. R. provides important clarifications
and explications regarding phenomenology’s
potential import and contributions to science. H. L. F.
provides an important counterpoint and skepticism
that carries the dialogue forward and encourages
these significant insights to surface.
How successful B. D. R. and H. L. F. have
been at clarifying these concepts is up to the reader
to decide but, if nothing else, this protracted debate
illustrates an adversarial collaboration which serves
as a bridge between differing worldviews (Tannen,
2002), relating to one meaning of the prefix “trans”
in transpersonal—that is, bridging. For transpersonal
psychologists, phenomenology provides a tool and a
challenge. It supplies a tool for radically investigating
the qualities that make the field "transpersonal" to
begin with as well as for closely describing the essential
features of the transpersonal objects and experiences
under investigation. It also challenges transpersonal
psychologists to closely examine and make explicit
the assumptions inherent in the noetic/noema lifeworld of the researcher, participants, and beyond.
Notes
1.   
Parts of this discussion have been previously
published in Robbins (2014).
2.    
Correspondence
concerning
this
article
should be addressed to Harris L. Friedman
at harrisfriedman@hotmail.com. This paper
was developed from the transcripts of email
correspondence between several regular
contributors to the Society for Humanistic
Psychology
(American
Psychological
Association [APA], Division 32) listserv. Several
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other individuals contributed to the overall
dialogue; however, for clarity and brevity, the
dialogue as presented here has been edited,
as well as limited to the contributions of the
authors. In addition, because these quotes are
from transcripts of an interactive conversation,
some of the usual expectations in APA writing
style may seem to not be consistently met;
however, exceptions are allowed with quotes to
retain the integrity of the source.
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